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A STEADY STATE LONGITUDINAL MANPOWER PLANNING MODEL




In the Navy's officer system there are several classes of
manpower (e.g. pilots and submariners) that perform specialized
jobs and also can perform several types of non-specialized jobs
(e.g. military training, personnel management, etc.). This report
is concerned with the general problem of allocating the different
types of jobs among the several classes of manpower.
The report describes a model that constructs a personnel
inventory by rank for each of several manpower classes (pilots,
etc.) and then allocates those people to the specialized and
common jobs that they are allowed to do.
The idea of the model is to allow a policy maker to quickly
reconcile billet requirements with the reality of available acces-
sions, job sharing targets between classes, and continuation rates
of the different manpower classes.
Different allocations can be produced either by assuming
the values of a few key variables, or they can be generated using
an optimization scheme that sets "allowable" percentage errors.
Four optimization variants based on this idea are described. The
report contains some typical data, the results of calculations,
and a description of computer programs used to solve the problem.
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This paper outlines the construction of a manpower plan-
ning model for a system in which each of several classes of man-
power are assigned to several categories of jobs. The jobs are
either specialized in that only one type manpower can perform
the job or general in that more than one manpower type is quali-
fied to do the job.
Both jobs and manpower are broken down by experience
level. A job with a certain experience level must be filled with
a person that has the same experience level.
The model assumes a steady state. In each year the job
requirements are the same. In each year the same number of people
enter the system (bottom level entry only) , the same number leave
the system from each experience level, and the same number move
up from each one level so that the inventory of people at each
exerpience level and in each manpower class remains the same.
There are several items represented in the model:
(i) The requirements for jobs by experience levels,
(ii) The requirements for people by experience levels,
(iii) The job sharing targets for common jobs; the fraction
of common jobs we would like to see allocated to each
manpower class,
(iv) The people sharing targets for manpower classes; the
fraction of each manpower class that we would like to
see allocated to each type of job.
(v) The rate of accessions in each manpower class,
(vi) The retention of manpower in each class; i.e. the
relationship between accessions in each class and the
inventory of people by experience level in each class.
The model is designed to study the interaction of these
factors. It is easy to see from the list above that items (i)
through (iv) are interrelated and unless care is taken in specify-
ing these goals they will be inconsistent. Also items (ii)
,
(v)
and (vi) are strongly related in that (v) and (vi) determine the
inventory of people in each class at each experience level. Only
in the most fortunate circumstances will this be consistent with
the personnel requirements (ii)
.
Items (i)-(iv) are targets. They may be unrealistic and
inconsistent but they can be set by the manpower planner. Items
(v) and (vi) , however, depend to some extent on the behavior of
personnel in the system (vi) and on the system's ability to
attract qualified people to each class (v) . The reader
should keep in mind this caveat and be prepared for shifts in
personnel behavior in response to changes in other system parameters
or in external factors.
The model is a laboratory for testing the relationship
between these factors. We can try one set of policies and look
at the discrepancy between job requirements and actual require-
ments as well as the discrepancy between personnel requirement
and the actual inventory in each class.
The model may be used in several ways. The easiest is for
the planner to stipulate a policy and then examine its effects.
A more difficult procedure is for the planner to stipulate a
range of policies and then use some type of optimization scheme
to select a policy within the range. This paper contains four
examples of this type of optimization. Each is based on the notion
of a penalty function the measures the discrepancy between desired
job and personnel requirements and what is actually provided.
We take two types of penalty functions: piecewise linear and
quadratic, and we examine two broad sets of policies: allocating
people to jobs using the job sharing rules ( (iii) above) , or
allocating people to jobs using the people sharing rates ((iv)
above) . This gives us four combinations and thus four distinct
optimization models. The piecewise linear penalty functions lead
to linear programming models and the quadratic penalty functions
to the minimization of a quadratic form subject to linear equality
constraints
.
The model is motivated by a study of the U. S. Navy's
officer corps. We shall carry an example using that system
throughout the text in order to illustrate each idea.
The model is based on a longitudinal manpower flow model.
This type of system is described in depth in Grinold and Marshall
[1] , Chapter 3. The use of piecewise linear penalty functions
to measure the discrepancy between actual performance and stated
objectives is commonly called "goal programming." This idea
has been extensively developed by Charnes and Cooper; a good
review can be found in [3]. The use of quadratic penalty functions
is quite common in the optimal control literature; its use in
more behavioral settings was pioneered by Holt, Modigliani, Muth
and Simon in [2]
.
The paper consists of several short sections each dedicated
to a specific point and most illustrated by the example carried
thoughout the text. The model's structure is given in Sections 1-14
Section 15 is a review that gathers all the definitions presented
to that point. Sections 16 to 20 describe alternative ways to
choose an allocation, the idea behind our use of penalty functions,
and the specific construction of the piecewise linear and quad-
ratic penalty functions.
Appendix A describes the two linear programming models
that arise from the use of piecewise linear penalties and
Appendix B the two models that stem from the use of quadratic
penalties. Appendix C contains some sample solutions.
The organization reflects the relative importance of
the topics. The structure of the model is the most important
and it is stressed and reviewed in Sections 2-14. The use of
optimization to select an allocation is, in the main, merely a
device to circumvent the difficulty of having a wide range of
policy choice. Once the optimization rule is set the planner
has a direct route from policy to result. It is the variation
in results that comes from changes in policy that will be of
most interest to the planner. The optimization is a device to
help make that connection.
One final point should be made before describing the
model's structure. This is an aggregate planning model. It is
intended to test policies that will, in turn, provide a foundation
for the day-to-day operating of the system. This model certainly
will not show us how to operate the system. No model can answer
all questions simultaneously and ours is no exception.
2 . Manpower
There are K different classes of manpower indexed
by k = 1/2,... ,K. The classification scheme is, of course,
directly related to the objectives of the model builder. In
general, the classification should be fine enough to capture
the important substitution possibilities and economical in avoid-
ing the listing of all possibilities in a futile attempt to repli-




















Table 2-1: The manpower classes.
3. Stages
Each officer's career is broken down into I-stages indexed
by i = 1,2,..., I. The stages can be defined in many ways. The
simplest is by period of service; if we track officers for 26
years then the index i would go from one to 26. In our example
the stages roughly coincide with the time period in which officers
hold a certain rank. In general for i = 1,2,..., I, stage i
will run from time of service s. , to s. . The maximum lengthl-l i ^




A person in manpower class k and in stage i of their
career will be called a type (i,k) person.
Stage LOS Description
1 0-2 Ensign
2 2-4 Lieutenant—J . G.
3 4-9 Lieutenant
4 9-14 Lieutenant Commander
5 14-19 Commander
6 19-26 Captain
Table 3-1. Stages or experience levels
4 . Manpower Flows
We assume a steady state model. In each year the same
number of people will enter each manpower class, and the inven-
tory of people in each year of service and in each manpower class
will remain constant.
For class k = 1,2,...,K let y, be the number of people
entering manpower class k, and let a(k,s) be the fraction of
these accessions that remain in the system for s years. The
index s runs from to S years and the function a(k,s) is
decreasing in s. The function a(k,s) is frequently called the
survivor curve.
Stage i of a person's career runs from length of service
s._, to s. (s
n
= 0). The number of people in stage k is
w • , y, where w., is defined byik-rk lk
s .
l
w • ^ = / a (k, s) ds .
S i-1
In our example, let's take a hypothetical survivor curve
for pilots (class 4). We follow these officers for 26 years.
Figure 4-1 shows the survivor curve. The shaded areas are
integrals under this curve for the duration of each stage.
The calculation of w., can be approximated using a
discrete form of the survivor curve.
The coefficients w., can be interpreted as the amountlk c
of time a person in manpower class k is expected to spend in
stage i. A crude way to view this is to say that w., is the
8
product of the probability of reaching stage i, and the length






ik s . - s . ,i i-l stage i
s 1 1.97 2 0.985
T 2 1.85 2 0.925
A 3 2.50 5 0.5
G 4 1.40 5 0.28
E 5 1.22 5 0.25
S 6 0.54 7 0.77
Table 4-1. The expected waiting time
5 . Jobs
There are J different types of jobs indexed by




1 1000 General, nonwarfare billets

















7 1300 General Aviation






























6 . Billet Requirements
The I by J matrix B contains the billet requirements
Since the career stage is a measure of experience (e.g. length of
service or rank), the requirements are broken down by stage.
b. . the number of stage i people need for jobs type j
The billet requirements matrix for our example is shown below.
The billets will be identified by the index pair (i,j)
Thus we shall speak of type (i,j) billets and type (i,k) people
JOBS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 409 2095 688 961 521
s
2 1008 1883 734 1998 1212 1
T
3 1806 378 2080 84 4 3572 1399 6 36
A
4 1495 599 1464 810 1780 547 726
G
5 1031 470 926 501 678 55 902
E
6 592 490 321 149 387
Table 6. The billet requirements matrix B.
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7. Billet Sharing Array
For each i the K by J matrix gives the share
(fraction) of the type (i,j) billets that should be performed
by manpower type k. The elements of F are denoted f,
.
,
they are nonnegative, and the rows sum to one, £, f , . = 1.
If f,. > , we interpret the fraction as a goal; we would
like that fraction of the (i,j) billets filled from manpower
class k. However, we interpret f , . = to mean that manpower
class k is not qualified to fill billet (i,j).
There is also possible confusion between the idea of job
sharing and a people sharing concept. A manpower class may per-
form two types of jobs: the jobs for which it is uniquely
qualified and other jobs that are shared among several manpower
classes. Another way to look at the allocation of the common
jobs is to stipulate a fraction of the inventory of (i,k)
people that should be assigned to job j. That idea will be
considered in Section 12.
To save space, we shall only give one of the matrices
F (for i = 3) used in our example.
JOBS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
M C 1 0.7
A
N L 2 0.15 .5 1
P
A 3 0. 06 .2 1
W
E S 4 0.05 .18 1 .57
R
S 5 0.04 .12 1 .43
Table 7-1. The job sharing matrix F for i = 3
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8 . Target Allocations





= fi.b. . .k: kj ±j
Recall that b. . is the (i/j) billet requirement and f. .
13 J ^ kj is
the fraction of those billets to be filled by manpower class k
The target allocations used in our example (for i = 3)
are shown in Table 8-1.
JOBS
1 2 3 4 5 6
M C 1 1264.2
A
N L 2 270.9 189 2080
P
A 3 108.36 75.6 844
W
E S 4 90.3 68.04 3572 362.52
R
S 5 72.24 45.36 1399 273.48
Table 8-1. The target allocation t, .
14
9 . Actual Allocation
Let the variable a,
.
give the actual number of (i,k)
people assigned to billet (i,j). If it was possible we would
like a, . = t, . . That would ensure that all targets are met.kj kj J
That, however, is usually impossible. Indeed, reconciling
the a, . and t, . is the purpose of this model.
The variables a, do not mean that a, individuals
from class k are locked into type (i,j) billets when they
are in stage i. It does mean that at any time a, . people
from class k are filling type (i,j) billets. Any particular
(i,k) person, may spend stage i in several billets.
If f , . = 0, then an (i,k) person is not qualified to








Recall that w.,y, is the number of type (i,k) people





= Wikyk for a11 (i ' k)
This says that all manpower fills some job.
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11. Excess and Deficit
One of our main objectives in constructing this model
is to compare the allocation and target. We could look at
all the discrepancies a., - t., . That would be very general,
but it may not be comprehensible. We have chosen to concen-
trate on more aggregate measures of excess and deficit: the
actual number of (i,k) people and the actual number of
(i,j) billets filled as compared with the targets. Our




= £ a, . the number of poeple assigned
ID ki x kj
to billet (i,j)
x. . - b.
.
the discrepancy between billet
(i,j) assignment and requirements
J
z., = £ a, . the number of (i,k) people
J
p., = 1 t, . the total requirement for type
(i,k) people
z., - p., the discrepancy between the inventory
of (i,k) people and requirements.
17
12. People Sharing
Recall that we defined our targets from the viewpoint
of billet sharing. Given any allocation we can calculate the
people sharing fractions. Let g be the fraction of type
(i,k) people that are assigned to job j, thus billet (i,j).




As mentioned above, an alternative model could be constructed
using the people sharing fractions g, . as input targets
and the billet sharing fractions f , . as outputs. In that
case we would start with people requirement ,Pik # and the
people sharing rules g£ . and define target allocations by
fckj = gkj pik*
Then we can calculate b. . from
b . . = y g, . p . , .
ID t *krik
In any case, for consistency, the following relations should
hold
18
(i) g, .p ., = f , .b . .
(ii) I 9^ = 1 ==> P-iv =
j=l
3kj ik 1 fi- b --j=l k ^ ^
K K
(iii) I fj. = 1 ==> b. . = V gp-.p.
k=l k=l j^ik
To assure consistency we should either start with f
and b and then calculate g and p, or start with g and
p and calculate f and b. If we have a desire to start with
g and b, then one suggestion is to guess p, see if it works,
and then do some revision.
From the values of b and f (for all i) used in this
paper, we can compute the personnel requirements, shown below.
Manpower Class
1 2 3 4 5
s 1 286 2156 713 981 537
T 2 706 2034 794 2049 1253
A 3 1264 2540 1028 4093 1790
G 4 1046 1988 1019 2376 991
E 5 722 1316 657 1328 540
.
6 414 655 283 338 249
Table 12-1. The personnel inventories, pik
19
13. Stage Substitution
The astute reader will notice that we have not allowed
substitution between stages. Thus a type (i,k) person is not
allowed to fill a type (i+1, j) billet or a type (i-1, j)
billet.
Our formuation actually allows such assignments, however,
we are assuming that they net out to zero. That is for each
(i,k) person filling a stage i+1 billet, there is an (i+l,k)
person filling a stage i billet.
One way to study the possibility of stage substitution
is to vary the length of the intervals (s._-,, s.) that
define the stages. However, the billet requirement are pre-
sumably set with some experience level in mind. Therefore
major shifts in the definitions of stages would require adjust-
ments in the billet requirements.
20
14. Cost
The cost of any allocation can be calculated using
I I
C ikw ikYk '
1 k
where c, is the annual cost of an (i,k) person and w.,y, = zIK IK K IK
is the number of (i,k) people. The cost data c, should
include salary, benefits, retirement; training, promotion, and
recruitment costs. Notice we can define c, as £, c, . , ,
and then rewrite the cost as J\ ck^k " We interPret c -u as




We have constructed our model. The remainder of the
paper is devoted to ways of calculating particular assign-
ments and contains a sample calculation.
We summarize here the notations and definitions pre-
sented to this point.
manpower class indexed by k = 1,2,...,K
stages of a career indexed by i = 1,2,...,
I
defined by length of service
IS-,/ ^ 9 ' ... t S-r'
jobs
people
indexed by j = 1,2,...,
J
indexed by stage and class (i,k)
accessions
stage inventory
y, , the number of people entering
class k per year
w- kyk is the number of (i,k)
people; y, is the accession rate
and w.-, is obtained from thelk
survivor curve and the stage
definition. Note z., = w., y, .
billets requirements
billet sharing
indexed by stage and job (i,j);
b. . is the billet requirements
indexed by (i,j,k); f, . is theK D
fraction of (i,j) billets that
should be filled from class k.
22
target allocation t, . . The number of (i,k) people
desired in billet (i,j)
actual allocation a, . the number of (i,k) people
in billet (i,j)
class sums x. . and b. . are respectively
the number assigned to billet (i,j
and the requirement for billet
(if j)
job sums z., and p., are respectively
the number of (i/k) people,
and the target for (i/k) people.
people sharing g, . , the fraction of (i,k) peopleK D
assigned to billet (i/ j) ;
l
kj = g z .kj ik*
cost c, is the annual cost of anik
(i/k) person. The cost of a particular
allocation is £. ), c, z., .
1 K IK IK
23
16 . Choice of an Allocation
Up to this point we have set out a model structure.
The next task is to devise one or two more procedures for
selecting allocations. There are two general approaches to
this task.
On approach is to use an ad hoc rule. For example,
we could fix accessions at projected rates for each class.
That would fix the variables y, and thus z., = w.-, y, •
Next we could specify the people sharing rules g, . . That





The second approach is to use some type of optimization
to select a policy. This optimization is either based on a
trade-off between the cost of any allocation and some measure
of its quality, or simply a measure of the quality of the
allocation.
24
17 . Quality of an Allocation
In order to choose an allocation using optimization
we need some measure of the quality of that allocation.
In our model we have already decided to focus on the
discrepancy between people inventory and targets (z., - p., )IK IK
and the discrepancy between billet assignments and requirements
(x. . - b. .)
.
We have selected the simplest form of quality measure
that makes sense. It is a penalty function that is zero for
a perfect allocation and positive for others. Thus it measures
the lack of quality. The penalty function has three properties
(1) The penalty can be written as
y y h.. (z., ) + y y i. . u. .)
v f lk lk L. L. in i]i k i j J J
where
(2) h., (z., ) and I. . (x. .) are nonnegative , convex and equal
to zero if z ±k
= pik and x^.
= b... respectively.
(3) Parameters 6. . and i> . . measure a unit upper and lower
percentage error in meeting billet requirements
if x. . = (1 + 9. .)b. .
,
ft..(x..) =1 1D 1: 1D
ID ID
or x.. = (1 - * i
j)b
i j •
Similar parameters <j> . k and 6 ik are used
for discrepan-




(z ik } - X
if z. k = (1 + cj). k )pik ,
or z. k
= (1 - 6. k )p. k .
Item (1) above says that the quality measure is
separable, item (2) that is nonnegative, convex, and zero if
the assignment is exactly on target. The third item requires
more discussion. Item (3) is designed to answer the question:
How do we compare a 4 percent shortfall in meeting a critical
target with a 10 percent short fall in meeting a less critical
target? Our answer to this question is to take a single
target as a benchmark and to say arbitrarily for that target
that a certain percent over and a< certain percent under the
target yields an error of one. Then for any other target
we can compare the seriousness of deviations with our benchmark.
We say a fraction 6 . . over target or ty . . under target is
as serious as the deviations we have established for our
benchmark.
For example, we could take stage 3 pilots as our bench-
mark (i = 3, j = 5) , and take the percentage under as 4%
(ip-,_ = 0.04) and percentage over as 10% (8^ = 0.10) as the
unit serious deviation for our benchmark. Now take any other
category, for example, stage 4 general warfare billets
(i = 4, j = 2) . Then we ask how much under target would the
assignment to these billets have to be in order to be as
26
serious as a 4% shortage of stage 3 pilots. In this way we
can try to make the essential judgments about the trade-offs
between different categories.
We shall now give two examples of penalty functions
and then give some practical examples of how such a criterion
could be used.
27
18 . Piecewise Convex Penalties
One of the simplest ways to construct the penalty measure
for deviations from target is to use a piecewise convex function.
To simplify notation we should consider the case of a discrepancy
between the inventory of people and desired inventories and
we shall drop the (i,k) subscripts.
We need a piecewise linear convex function h(z) that
satisfies
(i) h(z) =0 if x = p
(ii) h(z) =1 if x = (1 + <J>)p
(iii) h(z) =1 if x = (1 - 5 )p
Such a function is shown in Figure 2. This function
can be represented in several ways. One of the simplest is as
the maximum of two linear functions





'6 [ r '
_
This functional form is flexible and easy to manipulate.
We shall see below, that it can be used to obtain an allocation





Figure 18-1. Piecewise linear convex function
29
19 . Quadratic Penalty Functions
Quadratic penalty functions are also quite easy to use
Unfortunately, we cannot get a quadratic function to satisfy
all of our conditions. For example let us write
Jfc(x) = a(x - b) 2 + 3 (x - b) + y
We want to have
(i) i (x) = if x = b
(ii) £ (x) = 1 if x = (1 + 8)b
(iii) I (x) = 1 if x = (1 - i/0 b
(iv) I (x)
_>
where item (iv) implies I (x) has its minimum at x = b.
These four conditions cannot be met by a quadratic
function unless 6 = i/>; that is unless there is a symmetry
between being under and over target. In the symmetric case






I when 6 = \\>.
When the penalties are not symmetric, we must relax one of





1 ( x " b \ 1 (6 - ty) ,x-b.h(x) =
e? \—b— ) " 2 —e^ (-b~' ) '
This function has its minimum midway between (1 + 6)b and






This approximation is useful if 9 and \p are similar
However, the approximation becomes much worse when 9 and ifj
are much different.
Two quadratic penalty models are described in the
appendix.
31
20. Cost Quality Trade-Off
We saw above that any particular allocation has an
annual cost and also a penalty associated with its deviation
from targets for billet requirements and personnel inventories.
By placing different weights on the cost and penalty we can
obtain a family of objectives that will lead to efficient
allocations.
The cost-penalty frontier is shown below. Notice
the minimum cost solution is zero, since we would not have
any accessions; i.e. y = 0, thus no cost.
We write our objective as
A | ckyk (1-X) ( I I h. k (z. k ) + l I * ij( x..)} ,
As the parameter A increases from to 1 more emphasis is
placed on the cost and less on the penalty. At A = , we
minimize the penalty and ignore the cost; at A = 1 we
minimize cost and ignore the penalty. For intermediate values
of A we establish a trade-off between cost and penalty.
This curve should be used with some caution since the costs
are expressed in real units (dollars per year) , but the









This appendix describes two linear programming approaches
for selecting an allocation. The discussion is brief and is
intended for those familiar with linear programming. The first
model is called LPB for billet sharing and the second is called
LPP for people sharing.
In both models the idea is to choose the number of
people assigned to billet (i,j), and the number of accessions
in manpower class k; these are respectively denoted x. . and
y, . The allocation a, . is then fixed using an ad hoc rule.
We have selected two rules and thus get two different linear
programming models.
The first rule is for sharing billets
Rule B (billet share)
(A-l) a£. = fj.x. .kj k: ij
Recall that f , . is the fraction of type (i,j) billets that
we desire to have satisfied from manpower class k. Rule B
allocates the error in meeting billet requirements among man-
power classes so that there is a constant percentage error in
each class's allocation. If there is a percentage error of
n • • in meeting the billet (i,j) requirement, i.e.
34
x. . - b. .
ID \ b..
then the billet sharing rule means that the percentage error
in the assignment of type k manpower to billet (i,j) will
also be n . . .
ID
The people sharing rule is
Rule P
(A-2) a, . = g, . z..kj ^kj lk
where z., = ay is the number of type (i,k) people. The
type (i,k) people are allocated among different jobs using the
people sharing parameters g, . . If there is an error of n
.
in the inventory of type (i,k)
n
(z ik pik }
ik pik
then the percentage error in the assignment of type (i,k)
people to job j will be n., (recall t, . = g,.p.,). The
billet sharing rule leads to a larger linear program than the
people sharing rule.
The constraints of the linear program for billet
sharing are given below. The objective is the same for both
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The first set of constraints is simply the conservation
of people. There will be w.,y, type (i,k) people and under
the billet sharing rule f. .x. . of them will be assigned tok] i] y
billet (i, j)
.
The second set of constraints measures the difference
between actual inventories of type (i,k) people w., y, andIK K
the requirement P-t,' Tne objective is selected so that the
solution to the linear program will have e., positive and
d., equal to zero if w-^y, exceed p., and e., equal to
zero and d., positive if w.-,y, is less than P-i.* The
e., and d., thus measure the excess and deficit in thelk lk
type (i,k) people account.
The variables m. . and n. . play a similar excess
and deficit role in the type (i,j) billet account.
The first set of constraints for the LP-P program is
K
(A-3) x ij - I g£jW ikyk = for all (i,j) .
This again is a conservation constraint. There are
w • k-Yv tyPe (i/k) people and g, . of them are assigned to
job j. Thus these constraints assure that the assignments
to billets, x. ., are consistent with actual manpower available.
The second and third sets of constraints in LP-P
are identical with the second and third sets of constraints
in LP-B. They define the excess and deficit in people and
billet accounts.
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The form of the conservation constraint in LP-P allow
for some simplifications. Notice that if all the y, are
nonnegative then (A-3) implies that all the x. . will be
nonneqative. Thus we can use (A-3) to eliminate x. . from
ID
the problem. With this simplification the constraints of
LP-P are shown in Table A-2
.
The objective for both linear programs will typically
be a compromise between minimizing costs and minimizing the
penalty that measures our departure from people and billet
targets. The cost objective is
K
(A-4) I c y .
k=l K K
The penalty measure is
<A~ 5)
ill ik Vij + MiA: + Ji kl x Y ike ik + °ikd ik
where
(A-6)
(i) 7T. . = (0. .b. .)
1
13 1: ID
(ii) y. . = (\\>. .b. .)
_1
ID ID ID
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Recall that 6, ty , <J> , and 5 are the percentage errors that
lead to a unit loss.
A balance between these two objectives is obtained by
taking a weighted combination.
K




* J/i^ij + y ij mij + X X Y ike ik + a ikdik }i=l j=l J J J J i=l k=l
The problem LP-B has I * (J + 2K) constraints and
K + I x (2K + 3J) variables. For our example with 1=6,
J = 7 and K = 5 this means 102 constraints and 191 variables.
The problem LP-P has I x (J + K) constraints and K + I x (2K+2J)
variables . For our example this works out to 72 constraints
and 149 variables. LP-P is particularly easy to solve since
one can always get a reasonable first basic solution by guessing
the y, and then choosing the d., , e., , m. . , and n. . to
satisfy the constraints.
The duals of both LP-B and LP-P appear to be easier to
solve. The dual variables for each problem and each set of
constraints is shown in Tables (A-l) and (A-2) respectively.
The dual program for LP-B is
40
IK J
(A-8) maximize £ £* E vikpik + ^ £ 3ii b ii=l k=l 1K 1K i=l i=l ^ 1
subject to I uik fkj + q-L j £ ° for a11 (i/j)
" E Uikw ik + J. vikw ik i Xck for a11 k1=1 i=l
- (1- A)Y ik £ vik £ (1 - A)a ik for all (i,k)
- (1- A)7T
ij <_ q <_ (1 - A)y for all (i,j)
Dual of LP-B
The dual of LP-B has K + I x j constraints, I x (2K + J)
variables, and I x (K + J) of these variables have upper and
lower bounds. In our example this works out to 4 7 constraints,
102 variables, and 72 variables subject to upper and lower bound
constraints.
The dual of LP-P is shown below.
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IK I J
(A-9) maximize J J v p + T Y q b1=1 k=l i=l ]=1 J J
I J
;ubject to £ vikw ik + J J 5ij gkjw ik 1 Xck for a11 k
- (1 - X)Yik £ vik <_ (1 - A)a ik for all (k,i)
- (1 - A)7T ij <_ qij <_ (1 - X)yi;. for all (i,j)
Dual of LP-P
This problem has K constraints and I x (J + K) variables with
upper and lower bounds. In our example, this would be 5 con-
straints and 72 variables with upper and lower bounds. This




This appendix outlines two methods for selecting an allo-
cation using the quadratic penalty functions. The two models are
similar to the two linear programming models; they use the billet
sharing or people sharing rules to go from an aggregate problem
to a detailed allocation.
The models do not have any inequality contraints. This
is to insure that the solution can be obtained quickly. A full
model with inequality constraints might appear to be more appro-
priate, however, we must recall our ultimate objective is to cal-
culate allocations in a relatively simple way. The model is not
built on exact premises and it does not use precise data. It is there-
fore not terribly important to be exact in choosing an allocation.
We hope to have an easy and consistent way of choosing allocations
so we can compare the effects of changing assumptions on the
allocations.
Both models calculate the billet assignments x. . and
the accession rules y, . The actual allocation is determined by
the billet sharing rule in model UQ-B
Rule B .
(B-l) a,1 . = fj.x. . .
k;j kj i:
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In model UQ-P, the people sharing rule is used
Rule P.
1 1
<b-2) akj = gkjw ikyk
These rules are discussed in Appendix A.
The objective in these quadratic models is based on
symmetric penalties; i.e. 6.. = \\) .' . and <J*.. = <5- k « The
objective is a combination of two terms: the cost term and
a penalty term
K
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i=l j=i 1 3 ID ID i=1 k=1 1K Jc
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In the UQ-B model we minimize (B-3) subject to the conservation
constants.
J
(B- 5 ) J fkj xij " wikYk = ° for each (i' k ) •
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The people sharing model, UQ-P, minimizes (B-3) subject
to the constraints




In UQ-P we can substitute (B-6) directly into (B-3) and thus
solve a completely unconstrained problem. In UQ-B we minimize




This section contains some sample solutions using the
unconstrained minimization described in Appendix B.
The data, b. ., f , . , w.. , p., , are described in the paper.ij kj ik r ik r r
The p., and g,, are calculated in the manner suggested in
Section 12.
The solutions are based on data that is largely subjective
and does not, in any way, pretend to capture the situation that
exists in the Navy. The intent of this section is to demonstrate
the feasibility of the scheme.
The target errors are expressed in percentage terms. The
10,000% target error indicates that we do not care very much about
meeting billit or personnel targets in the first two stages.
Job
Stag^ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ENS 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
LTJG 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000 10000
LT 10 8 6 4 4 5 6
LTCDR 8 6.4 4.8 3.2 3.2 4 4.8
CDR 7 5.6 4.2 2.8 2.8 3.5 4.2











































Table C-2/ The inputs $., in % ; for manpower inventoriesIK
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The billet assignments and the actual percentage errors
using the people share rule are
STAGE/J03
ENS 1444 2231 1000 1791 972
LTJG 1498 1989 895 1669 908 1
LT 2164 383 2380 19 76 2021 992 399
LTCDR 1242 444 1246 586 977 395 452
CDR 1108 482 1000 489 578 63 884
CAPT 540 529 308 150 510








1 2 3 4 5 6 7
"253 6 ~45 ~86 "87
47 6 "22 "16 25 20
20 1 "14 "27 43 29 37
17 26 18 28 45 28 38
7 3 8 2 15 "15 2
9 8 4 "32
Table C-4. The percentage error in meeting billet requirements
The accessions to the five classes are:
Class 12 3 4 5
645 1162 524 926 508
Table C-5. Annual rate of accessions, y.
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These accessions produce the actual personnel inventories
and the precentage error in meeting inventories are given below.
Class 1 2 3 4 5
ENS 1274 2296 1035 1829 1003
LTJG 1192 2149 969 1712 938
LT 1613 2906 1311 2316 1269
LTCDR 909 1637 738 1304 715
CDR 789 1421 641 1132 621
CAPT 349 629 284 501 275
Tabl e C-6. Personnel inventory by class and stage, z..
1 2 3 4 5
"345 6 "45 "86 "87
67 6 ~22 16 25
28 "14 "27 43 29
13 18 28 45 27
9 8 2 15 ~15








Table C-7. Percentage errors in meeting personnel inventory budgets
The solution using the billet sharing rule produced similar










1801 2074 940 1388 1015
1685 1941 879 1298 949 1
2280 405 2423 1109 1399 1021 499
1284 370 1294 596 676 493 432
1115 496 1036 483 101 64 1173









1 2 3 4 5 6 7
"340 1 "37 "44 ~95
67 3 ~20 35 22
26 7 "17 "31 61 27 21
14 38 12 26 62 10 40
8 5 "12 4 85 "17 "30
17 "13 9 2 9 "27
Table C-9






These accession rates give rise to the personnel








1 2 3 4 5
1261 2345 1048 1478 1087
1180 2194 981 1383 1017
1596 2968 1326 1871 1376
899 1672 747 1054 775
780 1451 649 915 673








1 2 3 4 5
"340 9 47 51 ~102
67 8 23 33 19
26 "17 29 54 23
14 10 1 31 24
17 2 2 20 "20
Table C-12
The analysis of this output should be directed toward
constructive changes in the input data. Can we shift some
billet assignments from LT to LTJG and LTCDR? Should we
tighten up more on the pilot inventory? Should we change
the sharing rules? Is it possible to alter the survivor
fractions, and thereby improve the solution?
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We see that there are a number of potential questions
we can answer. The model is flexible and the calculations





This appendix shows how the programs and files




Number Dimension Symbol Description
1 (K,I,J) G People sharing array. +/G is
an (I,K) element matrix of ones.
G is nonnegative : g. . is the
K D
fraction of type (i,k) people
assigned to job(i,j)
2 (I, J) B The billet requirements. b.
.
J-D
is the number of type(i,j) jobs
to be filled.
3 (I, J) e The range for a unit error in
overfilling billets. If
x. . = (1 + 0.01 . .)b. . there
ID ij ID
is a unit error. 0. . > 0.
ID
Expressed as %.
4 (I,K) $ The range for a unit error in
overfilling personnel inventories
zik = (l|0.0|<|> ik )p ik a unit
error is counted. <b.. > 0.
IK
Expressed as %.
5 (K,I,J) F The job sharing array. F is
nonnegative and +/[1]F is
an (I, J) matrix of ones: f, .K D
is the fraction of type(i,j)
jobs to be filled by type(i,k)
people
.
6 (I,K) P The desired manpower inventory:






Number Dimensional Symbol Description
7 (N,K) a The survivor fractions for
each of the K classes . N
is the maximum LOS
.
8 I S The last year in each stage.
Increasing positive numbers
with S = N.
9 (I,K) w The element w., is the numberlk
of years a class k input expects
to spend in stage i.
10 K y The calculated accessions rate;
y, is the number of accessions
in manpower class k.
11 (I,K) z The calculated inventory of
each type of person. There are
z-i, type (i,k) people.
12 (K,I,J) A The calculated allocation: a, .
is the number of type d,k)
people filling typed, j) jobs.
13 (I, J) X The calculated billets filled.
There are x. . people in jobd, j) .
14 (K,I,J) T The target allocation. We want
tv • typed,k) people in typed/j)
jobs. If things are consistent
+/T equals P and +/[1]T equals B.
15 (I, J) <P The range for a unit error in
under filling billets. If
x. . = (1-iii. .)b. . then an error of 1





Number Dimensional Symbol Description
16 (I,K) 5 The range for a unit error in
underfilling personnel inven-
tories. If z. k = d-5 ik )p ik
then a unit error is counted.
6. k >0.
17 (K,I,J) C The element c, is the total
cost of having a type (i,k)





Function Uses Computes Syntax and Description
BILQUAD B, e, <J>, F,
P, W
Y, X, Z, A BILQUAD 'FILENAMS'
Calculates "optimal" acces-
sions y, personnel inventory
(z), and allocation (A),
given the data, objective,
and the billet share rule (F)
.
BILSIM F,Y,X Z,A BILSIM'FILENAMS'
Given Y and X (which pre-
sumably satisfy the conser-
vation constraint) , calculates
allocation (A) and personnel
inventory (Z), using the
billet sharing rule.
PGREC P, G B, F, T PGREC 'FILENAMS'
reconciles the file elements
B, G, and T with P and G
BFREC B, F P, G, T BFREC ' FILENAMS
'
reconciles the file elements
P, G, and T with the file
elements B and F in the
same file
.
PEOQUAD g, b, e, <j>,
F, P, W
Y, X, Z f A PEOQUAD 'FILENAMS'
calculates optimal acces-
sions (y) , personnel in-
ventory (z), billet staffing
(x) , and allocation (A)
,
given the data, and use of








COMPONENT SYNTAX AND DESCRIPTION
PEOSIM G, Y, W Z, X, A PEOSIM 'FILENAMS
'
calculates inventory z,
staffing x and allocation
A, where accessions and
people share rule are given.
WAITS a, S W WAITS 'FILENAMS 1
Given the survivor frac-
tions (a) and stage defini-
tions (s), calculates w
the expected waiting time
in each state.
PEOPRONT P, z lOOx(D-z) rP PEOPRONT 'FILENAMS'
calculates the percentage
error in inventory. Compare
with 0.
BILPRONT B, X IOOx(B-x) tB BILPRONT 'FILENAMS'
calculates the percentage












[2] Holt, C.C., F. Modigliani, J. F. Muth , and H.A. Simon,
Planning Production Inventories and Work Force
,
Prentice Hall (1960).
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